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a s fatta pen,
che s'altra maggio, nulla a si spiacente.
INF. VI, 47-8.
Science fiction has been called the literature of extrapolation. In the
spring of last year one of the leading magazines devoted to the genre ran a
serial, Gravy Planet,' in which the title role is played by an Earth that has
come to be dominated by the practices and philosophy of advertising. Com-
mon names for food and drink are heard no more; one raises, on Chicken
Little and Coffiest, a family whose size is the result of precarious balance
between the respective attractions of the promotional campaigns of a
gynecological trade-association promising "Babies Without Maybes," and a
proprietary formula known as PregNot. Functions of government are
performed under the aegis of prestige-laden trade-names, to whose owners
the great advertising agencies in midtown New York serve as ministries of
propaganda; food inspectors wear armbands of a well-known supermarket
chain, and there is a Senator, complete with phony Southern accent, from a
soft drink. Advertising itself is ubiquitous; attending to its message is both
a necessity and a felt duty of citizenship; objection is dangerous unortho-
doxy.
I especially remember one sequence. On a plane in flight, the cabin
windows are opaqued from time to time, and sound movies appear upon
them, to extol and illustrate the merits of the vaunted (though, as it turns
out, shoddy and worse) products of Gravy Planet material culture. In
climax, an "olfactory" hammers home the urgency of purchasing a named
deodorant, by filling the cabin with a life-like counterfeit of the consequences
of its omission. A passenger unthinkingly expresses distaste, but hastens to
explain that he didn't mean any harm ...
I stopped laughing just before the last installment came out. About that
time, the Supreme Court uttered its judgment in the case of the Washington,
D. C. "captive audience. ' 2 The captives at bar had become such by being
* Professor of Law, Columbia University.
1. Pohl and Kornbluth, Gravy Planet, Galaxy Science Fiction, June, July, August,
1952, republished sub nom. THE SPACE MERCHANTS (1953).
2. Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
The present article is not to be taken as a comment on the constitutional doctrine of
the case, but on the value-problems and the problems of law in society raised by it. Since
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trapped in busses and by there being forced to listen to news, music, com-
mercials, and other matter, all of such kind and in such proportion as seemed
good to the captor bus company and its privies.
The Court rejected the contention, which had been sustained 3-0 in the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 3 that so to use objecting riders was
to deprive them of liberty without due process of law. Douglas dissented
wholeheartedly; Black, in part. Frankfurter disqualified himself, as being
in his own person too outraged a victim of the captive audience scheme to
sit in serene judgment. Burton wrote for the Court.
The facts of the very case were in no wise unique, unless paradox be
thought sharpened by their having arisen in the capital city of a nation
perilously dedicated to leadership in the fight of our century against the
metamorphosis of homo sapiens into el hombre-masa. Despite occasional
checks4 the captive audience pattern threatens to spread through the so-
dedicated nation." In application to public transit, it works this way: The
bus company is paid by entrepreneurs (a group of whom operates on a na-
tional scale) for allowing them to install FM receivers in (and loudspeakers
inescapably throughout) its vehicles. The entrepreneurs line up an FM sta-
tion, which broadcasts special programs to which the bus radios are fixed-
tuned. The passengers listen to what the people at the station want them to
hear, whether they like it or not. Some like it. Some do not. Some exceed-
ingly do not.
Advertisers support the scheme; testimony in the Washington case
established that, during the time it covered, they paid a dollar a thousand
people for a spot announcement. That they may continue their support,
they have been assured, in one trade journal ad, "If they can hear-they can
hear your commercial!"' The Washington station has described itself
(again to the trade) as "delivering a guaranteed audience !"7
If your flesh crawls as did mine on first reading this phrase as applied
to American citizens going about their lawful occasions in their national
the law is not quite so egregious an ass as some would have it, it is no accident that the
issues of value and of efficacious legal working exhibit a parallelism to doctrinal issues, but
the latter are not here under examination, and a nolo contendere is entered as far as concerns
the doctrinal "correctness" (or, for that matter, "incorrectness") of the decision. Let those
hunt the snipe who believe in the bag.
3. Pollak v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 191 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
4. The particular operation described herein is actually shrinking, the Washington
broadcasts themselves having just been abandoned as "unprofitable." N.Y. Times, June
1, 1953, p. 1, col. 1. The factors that have brought this about are not now clear enough for
analysis. Such a reverse does not affect the merits of the issues broached in this article.
5. The managers of the current scheme are standing by. Ibid. It would be unsafe to
assume that a temporary set-back is the end-all of a pattern of action so tenaciously insisted
upon in the past and so clearly at one with certain manifest emergent trends in civilization.
6. Quoted by the court in Pollak v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 191 F.2d 450, 454 (D.C.
Cir. 1951).
7. Ibid.
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capital,8 then you will see why I think it only fair to throw up at this time any
pretense of neutrality on the captive-audience question. I am revolted by
the whole business. I see only one side to it. I think forced listening fits
perfectly into the circumambient culture on those Volga steamers where, at
last intelligence, it was a prominently featured amenity.9 But I tremble for
the sanity of a society that talks, on the level of abstract principle, of the
precious integrity of the individual mind, and all the while, on the level of
concrete fact, forces the individual mind to spend a good part of every day
under bombardment with whatever some crowd of promoters want to throw
at it.
I think this practice raises issues of high principle. I say this at the
start because the toughest obstacle to be gotten over, in dealing with the
subject in a vein of earnestness, is precisely the often-encountered feeling
that the whole matter, whatever its rights and wrongs, is rather trivial-
a bit of a fuss about nothing. I suggest that this feeling, where present, may
be in its origin associative rather than logical-that it fallaciously evaluates
the interests invaded by forced listening in terms of the incontrovertible
triviality and even trashiness of much of the stuff the captive audience has
to listen to. To drag this association into the open is to rob it of force. Sub-
jecting a man, willy-nilly and day after day, to intellectual forced-feeding on
trivial fare, is not itself a trivial matter; to insist, by the effective gesture of
coercion, that a man's right to dispose of his own faculties stops short of the
interest of another in -forcing him to endure paid-up banality, is not itself
banal, but rather a sinister symbol of relative weighting of the independence
of the mind of man and the lust to make a buck.
What follows may be regarded as only in a special sense a comment on
the Supreme Court decision. I am not going to talk about the law of the
case, but about the value-problems thereto subjacent. A few months ago,
the New Yorker, long a front-line fighter against audience captivity, ran a
lead paragraph in Talk of the Town, protesting the institution of forced
listening on busses in Yonkers. In obvious allusion to the Washington case,
the writer conceded that the would-be audience captor "has the Supreme
Court behind him."'" This just ain't necessarily so. The Court held, and
could have held, only that the objecting captives could not find their deliver-
ance in constitutional rights. One may disagree with that holding and still
recognize that it does not amount to general approval of coerced listening,
or to establishment of the right of the captor against all assailing. Every
8. See Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wail. 35, 43 (U.S. 1867).
9. Margaret K. Webb in a letter to The New Yorker, Feb. 18, 1950, p. 85, col. 1. This
letter should be read by those interested in the possibilities of extrapolation (and the wider
cultural integrations) of audience captivity. And see ORWrLL, 1984 (1949) passim.
10. The New Yorker, March 21, 1953, p. 27, col. 1.
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avenue of protest, save one, remains as open as ever-letters to the editor,
remonstrance to advertisers, complaint to the transit company, appeals to
legislatures, councils and commissions-and where constitutional protection
has failed these other modes of defense become even more important. The
main question is still open, and always will be open: "Do we want this thing
among us?" The Supreme Court cannot decide that for us."
Still, the constitutional case posed issues within the framework of which
questions of value may neatly be set. For when all the hemidemisemiqua-
vers of doctrine had died in echo, the most substantial questions came down
to this: "Does this sort of thing infringe the guaranty against deprivation of
liberty, and, if it does, is government so implicated as to bring into play a
guaranty good only against governmental action?" Breaking this down, and
recasting it in the form of that new scrutiny of major premises which the
radically novel case always induces: "What is liberty?" "What is it to
deprive a man of liberty?" "What sort and degree of governmental involve-
ment bring an encroachment on liberty under the ban?" And although these
are problems in legal doctrine, no intelligent layman, and no responsible
lawyer, will stand for their being left at that. Above each must be put a gloss
that is not wholly or centrally of doctrine. First, as to "liberty," the root-
symbol of the Republic: "What are the freedoms, franchises, autonomies,
integrities, the diminishment of which cheapens the worth of our citizenship
and our humanity?" Secondly, since a forbidding of deprivation, to be
worth the parchment it is written on, must really forbid that which really de-
prives: "What actions, in practical effect within the patterns of our society as
it stands, frustrate or make unavailable our enjoyment of freedom?" And
thirdly, given the multiform, complex and novel interventions of govern-
ment in affairs: "What relations of sponsorship, enabling, or abetment, be-
tween government and the 'private' encroacher on freedom, ought to be
looked on as amounting to a wrongful incidence, on individual man, of the
power of the Entirety?"
Of this last question, in its application to the captive audience case,
little need be said. (The Supreme Court assumed that governmental power
was at least sufficiently implicated to force examination of the further
issues.) 12 The relations between private transit companies and public
authority follow a set pattern in essentials; the Washington case was typical.
The transit company holds a virtual monopoly, granted by the competent
legislative body in implementation of considered public policy." A man has
11. And with careful explicitness disclaimed any intention of so doing. 343 U.S. at 465.
12. Id. at 462.
13. And, it may be added, of centrally important public policy. MacIver lists the
"establishment and control of the forms of communication and transportation" as the second
of the great functions of the State. MACIVER, THE MODERN STATE 190 (1926).
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to ride the busses of the one company because governmental authority says
they are to be the only busses to run. 14 Monopoly is the same thing as
absence of alternative to the customer; government is the grantor of trans-
portation monopolies. Further, where audience captivity prevails, the
administrative commission that acts as a governmental organ, charged with
the task of policing the exercise of the granted monopoly power, has ac-
quiesced in the use of that power to compel listening to the bus radio.
Wherever doctrine may "draw the line," commonsense will refuse to see,
in this pairing of prior empowerment by the State and subsequent ratifica-
tion by the State, a purely "private" wrong, if wrong there be. Whatever
coercion may inhere in the absence of a practicable alternative to the use of
public transit is a coercion directly flowing from a set of arrangements which
it has been an avowed public care to foster, and an accepted public respon-
sibility to police. It is a coercion readied and confirmed by public action,
and one of which the Entirety cannot wash its hands.
But is coercion present? Can a man be said to be "deprived" of his
freedom not to listen, when he only has to listen because he "chose" to get
on a bus? Bus companies would of course have us look on their relations with
passengers as purely voluntary on both sides, so that the annexation of
conditions to entering the bus can no more be looked on as coercive than can
the setting by the offeror of the terms of any private offer. If I were going
to argue doctrine, I should be happy to maintain that the notion underlying
this claim, the notion, namely, that coercion cannot be found in the tendering
of an extremely unpleasant or practically unavailable alternative to sub-
mission, is, in mid-twventieth century, a near-spent archaism even in law
itself.I 5 But, law aside, when the Supreme Court finished for the day on the
Monday our case was decided, what choice was really open to the attend-
ants and clerks of court, to the not lavishly paid government attorneys, to
the reference librarians in the Library of Congress across the way? Or to
such people (i.e., nearly all of us) in any city large enough to attract the
ministrations of the transit radio entrepreneurs? A taxi? Twice a day?
(Have you read any good budgets lately?) Keeping a car and parking it
downtown? Buying a nice house within walking distance of work, or moving
into a close-by apartment, big enough for the family? Well, all those things
may be possible "in contemplation of law." Abandoning that contemplation
and looking about, we know they are virtually impossible, in contemplation
14. And to run, of course, (if we need a make-weight) on the common highways, exist-
ing legally as public easements and maintained physically by public funds.
15. Holmes puts the general point best: "But the fact that a choice was made according
to interest does not exclude duress. It is the characteristic of duress properly so called."
Union Pacific R.R. v. Public Service Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67, 70 (1918). The threat of refusal
of services by a common carrier was early recognized as duress, See Dawson, Economic
Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MIcH. L. REv. 253, 258-60 (1947) and cases cited.
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of fact, for most pedple working in a great city. Once the loudspeakers have
blossomed on the bus wall, the only way most of us can avoid the daily
taking of whatever they dish out is to throw up the job and leave town.
That is the tendered alternative. That is the "or else ... ." Horsesense as
well as etymology is outraged by the suggestion that we have satisfactorily
protected the integrities of our citizenship when people have to get out of the
city to enjoy them. On the horsesense level, the substantial coerciveness of
the captive audience scheme is not a debatable matter. Admen know this,
and speak of guaranteed delivery.
As to both the questions just examined, we have to do with the eternal
tug between form and substance. Form is a good thing in its place-on a
bank check, say, or at the dinner table. Its place is decidedly not that of
evaluating and guiding practice in the dealings of collective force with the
private man. Most regimes and most societies succeed in being "perfectly
legal"; the technique for attaining that modest goal consists in just one
simple trick that always works: You seek the goal itself only "in contempla-
tion of Something-or-Other," and you don't let the issue get confused by
concrete social fact. This technique is not good enough if what we want is a
society in which (to such sublunary approximation as our frailty allows)
respect for individual integrity effectively prevails. In the sterner measure
of the latter criterion, it is beyond doubt that, if a valuable human interest
is invaded by making people listen daily to what somebody else thinks it well
for them to hear, such invasion is right now being accomplished by coercion,
and under the sanction of the State as representative of the social whole.
Which brings us to the crux. In court or out-whether in "construc-
tion" of the word "liberty" or in resolving whether the values it symbolizes
are impaired-the crucial question has to be that of the worth and dignity
of the interest the captive auditors bring to judgment. We face again the
fact that many, at first glance, look on the plight and the plea of the object-
ing captive as somehow infra dignitatem in a constitutional context. Asking,
above, why this should be so, I essayed partial answer, treating the question
as one in psychological causation.
I now ask it again, but this time rhetorically! Why on earth should
anyone committed to the central assumptions of our ethical life see anything
picayune or petty in the claim of a man to dispose, as he will and as unavoid-
able circumstances allow, of his attention and of the faculties it marshals, as
against the claim of a group of men to take this autonomy away from him
for their own profit? The objecting captive is in fact defending one corner of
a piece of ground that ought to be holy to all of us, if we make the smallest
pretense of meaning what we say when we speak most seriously about the
moral significance of our life as a nation. He is fighting in a novel quarter,
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for the means of general attack on the sector he defends tame only lately into
the hands of the aggressors. (I say "general" because coerced and unreply-
ing attention to the words of another is known immemorially as an individual
badge of servility.) But he is fighting, after all, for a very old freedom, a
freedom to which, in some sense, all the others are dedicated handmaidens-
the freedom of the mind. And the millenia rise up and cry out that he is
forever right in going to war to defend that freedom the moment a new
attack is mounted, no matter how large or small may be the force of which
it at present disposes, and without regard to its being camouflaged in the
motley of Madison Avenue.
I don't think it much matters what use any given rider might have made
of his faculties during the time (for many people quite substantial) of their
forced expropriation. Richard Burton used to memorize Old Persian vocab-
ularies on busses. (In hideous irony, the record in the Washington case
shows that, during the period it covers, he would have been forced to listen
to wordy and patronizing solicitations to study at the Berlitz School, by
which he would have been told-and, incredibly, I quote-"You need a
language to keep up with the Joneses and with your business.") I would
guess that some young men I have seen are dreaming of zootsuits and hot
rods. Lots of people read books and magazines; some close their eyes and
rest, or think about whatever they choose. A few seem to be shuffling and
examining papers having to do with a forthcoming or just-finished day's
work. Many peruse newspapers of their choice. Certain uses of the time one
has to oneself by virtue of being in a crowd may be a good deal more frivo-
lous than these. Others may be more serious; man remains a mystery, for all
the adman's philosophy, and we cannot know for sure that no bus has ever
run to Damascus. But the essential thing is that to be free in any regard is
to be able to choose what use one will make of that freedom, whatever some-
one else might think of the value of the chosen activity. Miscellaneity of
action, comprising inevitably some aimlessness and inanity, is the only vis-
ible body freedom possesses.
Forced listening attacks the mind's integrity with a new directness.
Previous assaults have tended to the slow starvation of the mind through re-
ducing the vitamin content in its fare, or to its frustration and atrophy
through forbidding its exercise in expression. It was reserved for our time'd
to produce that impresario whose happy blend of brash imagination and low
cunning apprehended what was to be done by bringing to bear the combined
16. Classical antiquity affords one non-mythological parallel. Of Nero, we learn that
"when he appeared [as a musician] publicly, his soldiers prevented the audience from leav-
ing, though some jumped from windows and others feigned death in order to be carried out."
ELSoN, THE BOOK OF MusicAL KNOWLEDGE 21 (1927). But the Neronian mode is dis-
tinguishable, at the least, by its forthrightness.
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crafts of the sound man and the advertising man on the coerced herdings of
city life, and he has authored a technic that pushes more deeply, though no
more painfully, into the minds of the unwilling than was possible to our
ancestors' homely ways of censorship and suppression. A man can no
longer fall back to the last wall of keeping his mouth shut and calling his
mind his own. The sound, too loud and insistent to be ignored, in the place
where he must be, now exacts, as a price of living a normal life in society,
submission to the daily entry of whatever certain slick operators think he
requires, in the way of entertainment, information, exhortation, instruction,
scolding and even, as admen boast in their trade papers, "conditioning,"
which is to say, tampering. Let us not let the brassiness of manner, the
sordidness of motivation, or the fast-talking speciousness in justification of
those who have opened this road lull or bedazzle us into failing to note the
direction it is taking. We have to do with an audacious deliberate attack on
the central citadel of human personality. The mere discernment of what it
is that is being attacked should, without more, lead us to condemn the whole
scheme.
There is more, though closely connected. Man, we are told, is a rational
animal. But we only know this because he is an animal that uses and under-
stands language. Talk, like sex and death, is laughed about a lot, but if man
has serious worth, then speech is a serious matter, for it is speech that maketh
him manifest. Few shafts could strike with more on-target insult at the
very manhood of humanity than its degradation into a collectivized object
of speech, powerless to escape and powerless to answer. Much has been said
and written, throughout the captive-audience controversy, on the relations
between "freedom of speech" and "freedom from unwanted speech." The
question whether the former includes the latter, as a matter of sound con-
struction, is a technical one of great difficulty. What is perfectly clear is that
the claim to freedom from unwanted speech rests on grounds of high policy
and on convictions of human dignity closely similar to if not identical with
those classically brought forward in support of freedom of speech in the
usual sense. Forced listening destroys and denies, practically and symbol-
ically, that unfettered interplay and competition among ideas which is the
assumed ambient of the communication freedoms. It contradicts, moreover,
what some would regard as a deeper though not often spoken ground for
letting people say freely what they choose to say-respect, namely, for each
man as a person, in his uniquely human and finally mysterious function as
user of language. For respect, like liberty, is indivisible, and most obviously
so when fine divisions are sought to be made in the same life-context. A
society which uses toward its members the wanton contempt of treating
their listening to words as a thing, to be reduced to possession and sold in
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carload lots at a dollar a thousand, cannot long hold fast to a contradictory
respect for their utterance of words as something inviolably close to the
center of man as man.
Forced listening rigs the market in ideas, for it heavily and arbitrarily
favors those communications agreeable to its managers. Since its managers
are advertisers or those who act in the interest of advertisers, the tendency
of the market-rigging cannot be guessed at without some reference to ad-
vertising itself. Let me repeat that the triviality and worse of commercials
tends to no extent whatever to imply the triviality of being forced to listen
to them. The implication, I insist, is to the contrary: It is the more offensive
to the dignity of a human being to force his submission to attempted im-
plantation of signal reactions; to contrived insult to his taste and intel-
ligence; to the beating of the drum that tells him to Do It . . .Today; to
the piping of the fife that seeks to set up in his spine a cortically unaccept-
able (and viscerally nauseous) association linking a company that has been
in trade for 76 years with the Spirit of '76; to the suggestiofalsi of the "three
out of four physicians interviewed"; to the whole disgusting prelogical
plucking at the strings of shame and vanity and fear.
But the market-rigging function of forced listening suggests attention
to another side of advertising. It has, its exponents tell us, a Philosophy, a
Way, and even (for an adman stops at nothing) a Gospel. One Article of
Faith in this Gospel emerges as a matter of soundest induction, commercial
by commercial: Prices were never so reasonable, products never so fine, and
the lot of you folks out there never quite so roseate in hue. We know
another Article well, for it is the easily tallied integral sum of all advertising,
and its deepest philosophic wellspring: Material possessions produce hap-
piness. (Symmetry is thereby served, for another Gospel has much to say
to the same proposition.) Whatever admen might admit or deny, adver-
tising as we know it contains, as a net matter, these twvo implications, and
one could probably add a few more of connected tendency and comparable
generality.
Now to pound such implications into the heads of those who have to
listen is not merely to make a pitch for one product after another. It is to
implant attitudes and even implicity to communicate views on arguable
matters of weight and of public interest. The adman has every right to preach
his Gospel, and to insinuate advocacy of the following of his Way. But is it
consonant with any notion of free competition among ideas, or, indeed, of
freedom of any kind, that all of us should be forced to hear him or become
hermits? That is not true, and no one would dare suggest it be made true,
of any other Way, or of any other Gospel.
As to "news" the case is even clearer, for controversiality, of subject
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matter at least, is manifest. All "news" is and has to be biassed, for it is the
end. product of choices among literally uncountable subjects, aspects, ar-
rangements, words, and, on radio, tones of voice. Diversity of sources, and
unhandicapped competition among them, are our safeguards.17 Of these we
have, in sooth, no expendable surplus. But forced listening to one version,
whether of "fact" or "comment," rigs this particular corner of the market to
an unprecedented degree.'
The more I have thought about this captive audience business, the more
it has seemed to me that the case against it can be summed up in a single
sentence: It doesn't fit in. The disconformity is general, outreaching
illustration. It is impossible to read Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent in the
Washington case without feeling that, whatever the merits of the technical
constitutional issues, here speaks the voice in full and unembarrassed har-
mony with the best our culture has had to say. It would be an awkward,
stumbling job to try to explain to a well-disposed foreign visitor that audi-
ence captivity is not just "perfectly legal" but fully consonantwith those of
our aspirations and practices of which we are proudest before the world.
A few defenses have been offered. One of them, to which I shall assign
the number "zero," runs to the effect that riders don't really have to pay
attention, but may withdraw their minds at will, the whole thing being
"psychological." I don't think it worth while to discuss such a defence when
it is put forward by those who have marshalled every resource of societal
pressure, technology, and applied psychology to the precise end of making
the withdrawal of attention as difficult as possible-who have even installed,
as one trade ad brags, 9 a special device to boost volume when the com-
mercial comes on. Under the same number, let's throw in the attempt at
equating the loudspeakers with car posters or highway signs; that argu-
17. See Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 602 (1953), expanding
this theme and citing the words of Learned Hand, J., in United States v. Associated Press,
52 F. Supp. 362. 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), where he speaks of the press as serving "one of the
most vital of all general interests: the dissemination of news from as many different sources,
and with as many different facets and colors as is possible. That interest is closely akin to,
if indeed it is not the same as, the interest protected by the First Amendment; it presup-
poses that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues,
than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be folly;
but we have staked upon it our all."
It is hard to imagine a selection more authoritative than one to which most people must
listen, almost every day.
18. All the above points can be expanded in many directions. We need only think of
busses to think of school children, Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), and
the collocation of the two, in the constitutional field of reference in which they have met,
brings to mind the parental claim to select the indoctrinations the child shall or shall not
receive. Children do ride busses, and they must ride them, as Everson reminds us. Yet if a
parent prefers that his child not be taught to envy his neighbors' possessions, and he hon-
estly believes that this is a part of the advertising message, or if he had as soon Junior were
not told to nag Mommy into buying Studgies and a smart adman thinks of telling School-
bound Junior to do just that, is the parental claim de minimis?
19. Cited by the court in Pollak v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 191 F.2d 450,454 n.5 (D.C.
Cir. 1951).
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ment might convince a being from Mars fresh off the spaceship, but most of
us Terrans are aware that you can close or avert your eyes, but cannot close
your ears or avoid hearing what is in the air around them.
The other defenses may be at least worth numbering. It is said, first,
that most riders like the stuff. Tame "surveys" have been taken, and pro-
duced their unsurprising results. Other surveys have seemed to contradict
these results. Surveys are not, after all, the last word in the matter, what-
ever their outcome, for if our nation is committed to anything it is to the
ranking of some interests as beyond the reach of majority preference, and
the question would still subsist whether the interest asserted by the dis-
senting captive, as above characterized, ought to be one of these. But no
survey has taken into account, in the framing of its questions, the difference
(one which precisely marks civilized man) between merely liking something
and insisting on what you like at whatever cost to others. For no survey has
solicited or tabulated the answer to this question: "Even if you enjoy these
broadcasts, as far as your own tastes go, do you want to continue to be
amused if a good many of your fellow passengers are deeply outraged by
them?" It is hardly complimentary to a civilized population to assume that
the answer would be in the affirmative-and hardly hopeful for the actual
existence of those feelings of respect for others which we like to think our
society embodies. I have faith that a great majority of our people would
not wish to purchase relief from tedium with the coin of others' anguish and
felt insult.
Secondly, we are reminded that liberty is never absolute, but always
"qualified." Yes, but how? In this as in many contexts the sound gloss on
"qualified" is "subject to abridgement for good public cause." There is
where the audience captors get into trouble. Of course we would all acquiesce
in the enforced assembly of the population to listen to air-raid instructions.
But what has that to do with the delicious T-bone steak at the Fat' Boy
Restaurant?"
Thirdly (and with climactic speciousness), it is pointed out that a good
deal of noise, verbal and non-verbal, is inescapably incidental to city life,
and that this, after all, is just one noise more. But the bus-radio scheme is
not inescapably incidental to anything else, but rather itself a contrivance
precisely aimed at the coercion of listening. What would we think of a man
who turned a hose on passers-by, and defended his action on the ground that
people in those parts were often caught in the rain? The argument, as argu-
ment, falls flat on its face, but the facts it brought with it get up and march
in the opposite direction. Privacy and freedom from distraction are indeed
20. It was suggested at one stage in Pollak that the radio apparatus might come in
handy in an emergency. Cf. Lamb, A Dissertatiot Upon Roast Pig (1822).
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rare in modern life;21 the spoliation of what remains of them is hence the
more injurious.
22
In all cases, but most of all in the case where trouble is made and de-
cision forced, social action is not just action, but symbol as well. Forced lis-
tening goes on among us. Its more than patentness enhances its symbolic
function; where it prevails it is something everybody is sure to notice as a
prominent feature of our life. The Supreme Court has validated it against
constitutional attack and, as the New Yorker comment2 3 shows, that valida-
tion will publicly be taken to reach wider than it does. We have mostly
acquiesced in it-at least we have not, as we should have done, screamed
about it until no adman would touch it with a ten foot pole.24 I don't like
any of these things as facts. But I more than dislike what they seem to
symbolize, as to the values held in action among us, in the teeth of our pro-
fessions. And I am disturbed by the docility with which those professions,
when an issue like this comes up, behave themselves and stick home in their
abstract empyrean, leaving concrete social fact alone.
We hire halls in which to tell one another how much we respect the
Mind of Man. But as Man rides the bus home from the lecture, what is the
bus radio saying, beneath its acquiesced-in blarings, in the solemn gesture-
language of the deed?
Something like this, I am afraid: That the mental and spiritual in-
tegrity of the citizen will not be insisted on to ridiculous extremes, if it gets
in the line of march of the fast buck; that a human being, if he happens to
be in a crowd, is properly to be treated as a means rather than as an end, as
a commodity rather than as a person, not as a unique subject but as a fun-
gible object, promised for daily delivery guaranteed; that intellectual insult
is after all de minimis, and to resent it is to make a tempest in a teapot; that
our culture, without missing a stitch, can accommodate among its norma-
tive and behavior systems a new pattern (hitherto associated with rather
21. Surcease from advertising itself may yet acquire a high scarcity value. In an article
entitled No Hiding Place, Time, Oct. 17, 1949, p. 75, col. 1, reports on a (self-explanatorily
named) Storecast Corporation of America. Indeed, the stage is set for cashing in. A New
York man has patented a jukebox that blares commercials unless fed with nickles. News-
week, Feb. 23, 1953, p. 65, col. 1.
The general trend has many symptoms: "In Peoria, Illinois, a daily music program is
piped into the reading rooms of the Public Library. . . " The New Yorker, May 2, 1953,
p. 21, col. 1. Frederick Othman reports on a device enabling the station to turn on home
sets at will, Too Quick Switch, N.Y. World-Telegram and Sun, Nov. 14, 1951, p. 27, col. 1.
22. As to all these points it might not be improper to import the wise words of the court
in Rochin v. California: "We are not unmindful that hypothetical situations can be con-
jured up, shading imperceptibly from the circumstances of this case and by gradations
producing practical differences despite seemingly logical extensions. But the Constitution
is 'intended to preserve practical and substantial rights, not to maintain theories.'" 342
U.S. 165, 174 (1952).
23. The New Yorker, March 21, 1953, p. 27, col. 1.
24. Since the above was, written, the ten-foot pole market may be trending upward.
See note 4 supra.
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different cultures) the aim and effect of which is to make of our people a
herd handily corralled for whatever purpose certain resourceful gentlemen
may think proper and of profit; that, when protest is stirred against such a
paradox, quite enough answer has been made when it has been justified
formally, in terms of the elegantia juris or of layman's legalism, whatever
may be the inelegant facts of the matter.
I do not suggest that, in our acquiescence to audience captivity, we
have decisively accepted the value-judgments it symbolizes. One bad custom
cannot corrupt the world. But as long as it prevails, our manifest practice
daily and deeply contradicts our professions, and that is a dangerous matter.
For something always gives, and too often it is the professions, or, more
insidiously, the sincerity with which they are held, or the wideness of their
understood extent.
Leaving the analysis of this and that interest, of this and that value,
I would be content to stake the whole case on a judgment in what might
almost be called the aesthetics of societal action, a judgment as to the felt
rightness or wrongness of one picture from our life. One morning this spring,
in the capital of our Republic, people in thousands were seated and standing
in vehicles where, because of the very structure of life and work, they had
to be. Through all the vehicles, and into all the ears, came a single voice.
And the voice said the same thing, and all the people listened to the same
thing, in galled or docile obedience-down Pennsylvania Avenue, and near
the Station, and past the Memorial and the Monument, and by fountains
and waters, and on a hundred lesser streets, all over town.
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